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aIM aND BacKgRoUND 
This study sheds light on the effects of increasing 
bureaucratisation in the performance of (academic) 
organisations. There is a long tradition within orga-
nizational theory shedding light on the impact of
structural features in the behaviour and/or 
performance of social participants (March and Simon
1958; Blau and Scott 1962; Thompson 1967). The 
interest on bureaucratic systems emerged in the first
half of the 20th century, driven by Max Weber’s 
(1968) seminal work on the topic. Scholars following
this line of inquiry tend to conceive of organisations 
as rational systems, i.e. as tools or instruments 
carefully crafted to accomplish certain predetermined 
goals. Over the years, organisations ceased being
conceived as isolated (closed) entities, and the impact
of environmental aspects on their structural 
features and performance came to the fore (Scott
2003). A key assumption underlining such scholarship
efforts pertains to the fact that organisations strive to 
develop effective and efficient formalised structures, 
with considerable attention given to the technical or
resource features of their environments (Pfeffer and
Salancik 2003). 
Empirical studies on the effects of bureaucratic 
structures on organizational behaviour/performance
are rather inconclusive. One line of inquiry points 
to the fact that, in given circumstances, increasing 
formalisation (i.e. the predominance of rules and 
operational procedures guiding actors’ behaviour) 
helps to; clarify role and job expectations, reduce 
individuals’ alienation, and enhance organisational 
commitment or loyalty (Organ and Greene 1981; 
Ruekert, Walker and Roering 1985; Snizek and 
Bullard 1983). In contrast, others point to the negative
outcomes of bureaucratisation in the form of
increased alienation of professionals (Cox and Wood
1980), diseconomies of scale (Coccia and Rolfo 2007),
and the development of “bureaupathologies” 
amongst participants (Thompson 1961). The above
findings have led some to speculate on the existence 
of two types of bureaucracies, one enabling and one
coercive (Adler and Bryan 1996). Zeitz (1984), for
one, argues that the influence of bureaucratic 
structures is largely mediated through individual 
roles. This line of thought defends the notion that 
organisational members react favorably to well-
delineated rules, however, it is argued, they dislike 
the restricted autonomy and personal enforcement 
that generally accompany them (ibid. p, 301). Others 
claim that the pragmatic exigencies of the work 
context and the task at hand, including the levels 
of “red tape” involved, are stronger (contextual) 
determinants of bureaucratic behavior rather than 
individual characteristics per se (Guy 1985; Scott 
and Pandey 2000). 
As far as entrepreneurial dimensions are 
concerned, and despite sporadic accounts of 
entrepreneurial behaviour at public bureaucracies 
(Scott 2002: 479), the overwhelming evidence seems
to suggest that hierarchical systems tend to exert a
negative effect on performance; from the hampering
of personal initiative, creativity and innovation 
(Merton 1940; Schumpeter 1942; Hlavacek and 
Thompson 1973), to the under-supply of nascent 
entrepreneurs and the scarcity of entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Sørensen 2007). At the macro level, 
recent studies suggest that bureaucracies hinder 
economic development through setting regulative 
barriers to entrepreneurial behaviour (Svensson 
2008). With regard to the interface between contextual
(work environment) and dispositional (personality 
traits) approaches (c.f. Sørensen 2007: 388-9), recent
inquiries point to the critical importance of 
contextual factors. Several studies have suggested 
that the types of organisations individuals work for 
affect the likelihood of entry into entrepreneurship 
(Saxenian 2000; Klepper 2001). At the micro level, 
there is vast evidence pointing to the link between 
peer effects and entrepreneurial behaviour (Nanda 
and Sørensen 2006; Saxenian 1994). 
focUs aND sIgNIfIcaNcE 
The current study focuses on a specific organisational 
form, (public) universities. Scholars have long
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considered universities as distinctive entities, for a
variety of reasons: their loosely coupled nature (Weick
1976); the inherent complexity associated with their
core technologies (Musselin 2007); the difficulties in
measuring outcomes (Massy 1990, in Gumport and
Pusser 1997); the multiplicity of functions involved 
(Kerr 2001); their ‘bottom-up’ orientation (Clark 1983); 
etc. Students of organisations have long recurred to 
universities as units of observation/analysis. Such 
inquiries resulted in widely adopted organisational 
concepts as professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg 
1979), organised anarchies (Cohen and March 1974), 
and/or loosely-coupled systems (Weick 1976). As 
far as their structural features are concerned, some 
have suggested that universities possess a built-in
‘dualism’, i.e. a conventional administrative 
bureaucracy co-existing (side-by-side) with a 
traditional collegial governing system (Gornitzka, 
Kyvik and Larsen 1998; Birnbaum 1988; Clark 1983). 
In their essence, academic structures are composed 
of two closely related elements; (i) a bureaucratic 
structure, made of various internal units; and (ii) a 
programatic structure, based on degree programs 
(Gumport and Snydman 2002). 
Numerous external demands and expectations, 
combined with changes in student enrolments and 
knowledge structures in the past four decades or so,
have resulted in an increasingly complex and 
turbulent environment for universities operating on
both sides of the Atlantic (Gumport and Sporn 1999;
Trow 2005). This new state of affairs called for 
increased accountability to a wide variety of 
stakeholders (Neave 2002). Gumport and Pusser 
contend that, in the U.S., environmental “demands 
have shifted from asking the university to do what it
does for less money to asking the university to change
what it does”. (1997: 4) In Europe, starting in the early
1990s, government-led reforms aimed at the
devolution of authority have resulted in substantial 
changes in the structural arrangements of universities 
at the level of their managerial/administrative 
structures (Amaral, Meek and Larsen 2003; Gornitzska 
and Larsen 2004). 
There is solid evidence from both sides of the 
Atlantic pointing to a dramatic increase in the level 
of resources (people and funds) re-directed to 
administrative or bureaucratic tasks. An analysis of
Californian universities over a 25-year period (up to 
early 1990s) reveals an administrative staff increase 
of 151%, with administrative expenditures rising by
400% (Gumport and Pusser 1995). A similar enquiry 
covering the entire country shows that the number 
of non-faculty professionals at US colleges and 
universities more than double between 1976 and 1991
(Gumport, Iannozzi, Shaman and Zemsky 1997). In 
Europe, across the Nordic countries, a relatively 
large increase in the numbers of administrative staff, 
when compared to faculty, has also been reported 
since the early 1990s (Lane 1990; Visakorpi 1996; in
Gornitzska et al. 1998: 21). In Norway alone the 
number of administrators at public universities more
than doubled throughout the 1990s (Gornitzska and 
Larsen 2004: 458), with a 45% rise in the last decade 
(Gornitzska, Larsen and Gunnes 2009). Findings from
Southern Europe also confirm these trends, with the 
average yearly growth of administrative personnel 
at (Italian) universities reaching 15% (Coccia 2009: 97). 
Scholars following the above developments have
pointed to the key role undertaken by professional 
administrators in managing or orchestrating 
universities’ adaptation to the demands of an 
increasingly complex external environment (Neave 
1997). Gumport and Sporn (1999: 7) argue that, not 
only is university administration called upon to 
implement change processes but it is also given the
critical task of buffering the institution from certain
external forces. In a similar vein, Dill (1992: 15-6) 
argues that the transition from oligarchic to 
predominantly democratic governance-structures 
created the conditions for having professional 
administrators attending to the conflicting interests 
inherent to the modern university. Studies from 
Northern Europe indicate that, at the unit level, the 
typical university mechanism of strategic response to
new demands (environmental and in-house) is the 
hiring of an increasing number of professional 
administrators, and that, as such, this process is not 
necessarily the result of intense strategic planning 
(at central levels) but rather as a consequence of 
many small decisions taken at different levels and 
at various forums (Gornitzka and Larsen 2004: 468). 
However, this does not exclude the fact that, in some
circumstances, “the build-up of a professional 
administrative corps at departmental level was [is]
part of a university policy”. (ibid., p. 469) Gumport 
and Pusser contend that, when resources are 
abundant, intra-organisational conflicts are often 
mediated by adding positions and resources instead 
of making exclusive choices (1995: 502). 
As far as outcomes are concerned, a classic study 
by Blau (1973) shows that larger universities tend to
have lower ratios of administrators to faculty, but 
that economies of scale at these institutions occur at
a declining rate over time; a thesis confirmed in 
more recent inquiries (Gumport and Pusser 1995).
Birnbaum (1988: 79) argues that university 
administrators inspire the confidence of external 
constituents given their rational command of data.
Gumport and Sporn (1999: 38) claim that the 
expansion of university administration results in the
re-allocation of authority/power leading to 
counterproductive forces, splitting academics and 
impeding adaptation. There is evidence pointing to
the fact that administrative bureaucratisation (defined 
as the disproportional growth of administrative staff 
in comparison to core activities) leads to academic 
bureaucratisation, i.e. the increasing involvement of
academic staff in administrative-related tasksR
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(Gornitzska et al. 1998: 23-4). Studies indicate that a
considerable amount of faculty time (up to 24%), in
Europe and the US, is spent on activities directly
linked to internal administration such as participating
in meetings and drafting reports for management 
agencies (Teichler 1996; Helsey 1992; in Gornitzska 
et al. 1998: 22). Within modern university systems, 
scholars point to a key dilemma. As such, “faculty 
demand administrative support but they need to 
retain control and influence, and this contributes to 
academic and administrative bureaucratization”. 
(Gornitzska et al. 1998: 47) 
When it comes to the effects (positive/negative) of
increasing bureaucratisation in university 
performance, there is, generally speaking, a lack of
authoritative evidence (c.f. Amaral et al. 2003). 
Nonetheless, studies from Europe in the last two
decades or so suggest that (academic) 
bureaucratisation is likely to have a negative impact
on research performance (Gornitzka et al. 1998: 22;
Coccia 2009). At a broader level, the existing literature
on bureaucratic systems reveals a positive correlation 
between high levels of formalisation and both, the
size as well as the age of the organization (c.f. 
Sørensen 2008); with larger and older institutions 
ranking highest. As far as university systems are 
concerned, there is empirical evidence (U.S. and 
Northern Europe) pointing to a positive correlation 
between size, complexity, and administrative costs 
(Brinkman and Leslie 1986; Gornitzka et al. 1998). As
far as research performance (citations and rankings),
the available data seem to indicate that older and 
larger universities tend to outperform their smaller, 
often younger, counterparts; both nationally and 
globally (Gómez, Bordons, Fernández and Morillo 
2009). 
With respect to entrepreneurial activities there is
little systematic evidence of the interplay between 
the (entrepreneurial) behaviour of academic units
and their research performance (Jaffe, Lerner, 
Stern and Thursby 2007: 573). In spite of the general
acknowledgement that the supply of academic 
discoveries with commercial potential is heavily 
dependent on the (research) productivity of faculty, 
a recent historical analysis from the U.S. found no
correlation between various indicators of technology
transfer (disclosures, licenses, patents) and university
research expenditures (Geiger and Sa 2008: 154). In a
similar manner, Owen-Smith’s (2003) analysis found
limited support for the generic claim that scientific 
performance (publication impact) directly leads to
patenting. Studies from the U.S. show that, inspite 
of the fact that publication rates far outstrip patenting
rates, patent volume is positively correlated with
paper citation (Agrawal and Henderson 2002), thus 
suggesting that patents maybe a reasonable measure
of research impact. Other studies indicate that 
patenting events do indeed follow flurries of 
publication however performance (citation rates)
tends to decline (10 to 20%) after a patent has been
granted (Jaffe et al. 2007). The literature also
highlights the importance of university administrators
in the pursuit of academic entrepreneurship, given
their critical role in balancing multiple objectives 
and potentially competing stakeholders (ibid. p, 575).
As for the effects of increasing formalization/
bureaucratisation into internal efforts geared towards 
the commercialisation of academic knowledge, by
and large, this aspect is rather neglected in the 
existing literature. Clark’s (2008) classical study of
entrepreneurial (European) universities makes 
reference to the importance of a strengthen steering 
(managerial/administrative) core: “Numerous 
administrative units paralleling the many research 
and teaching units of outreach are part of what makes
the entrepreneurial university a proactive place”.
(ibid. p, 504) Nonetheless, Clark’s analysis, exclusively 
based on internal qualitative accounts, says nothing 
about the impact of increasing formalisation (rules, 
procedures, etc.) in the performance of academic 
units, either in terms of their research performance 
or with respect to the level of entrepreneurial 
(commercialisation) activities. 
There is a vast literature on Technology Transfer 
Offices (ttos), mostly from the u.s. Four important 
elements deserve to be highlighted. Firstly, there is
an increasing concentration of licensing revenue 
both, within particular fields (life sciences) and 
amongst a relatively small number of highly 
prestigious research-intensive universities, half of 
which are public (Geiger 2004: 218). Secondly, the 
data shows that tto activity is characterised by 
constant returns to scale, and that productivity is 
likely to be influenced by certain organisational 
practices like academic incentive systems and/or the
professional capacity of tto’s staff (Siegel, Waldman
and Link 2001). Thirdly, in certain national contexts 
(like the u.k.) ttos exhibit low levels of absolute 
efficiency, with older and larger offices lagging 
behind (Chapple, Lockett, Siegel, and Wright 2004:
24). Lastly, efficient and effective ttos make 
patenting compatible with academic science, in 
contrast to more bureaucratic entities which tend to
be narrowly focused on revenue generation (Owen 
Smith 2000, in Geiger 2004: 221). 
In brief, the proposed study addresses an 
important knowledge gap by looking at an aspect 
that has received little empirical investigation and
theoretical exploration, namely; the effects on
performance arising from the increasing 
bureaucratisation of academic structures. By looking 
at specific organisational entities like universities, 
in the context of their core (research performance) 
and peripheral (commercialisation of knowledge) 
activities the current study sheds needed light on 
the ways in which various “modes of organising” 
–hierarchies, markets, and networks (c.f. Thompson, 
Frances, Levacic and Mitchell 1991), are seemingly85
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combined under one roof, an aspect that has been
somehow neglected in recent theorising on 
organisations (Baum 2007; Greeenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin and Suddaby 2008). The study directly 
addresses recent calls towards the analysis of the 
growth of (academic) administrative structures across
types of institutions and national settings (Gumport 
and Sporn 1999: 38; Gornitzska and Larsen 2004: 470),
as well as a renewed interest on bureaucratic 
features by organisational scholars (Lounsbury and
Carberry 2005; Olsen 2005; Gay 2005). A major
premise of the study is the notion that administrative
expansion and the consequent re-allocation of power
and authority to a new professional class within 
universities (Gornitzka and Larsen 2004) occurs 
against the backdrop of internal responses to an 
increasingly complex and volatile environment. As is
the case with other organisational types, universities
adapt to the technical and institutional features of
environments by increasing the complexity of their
internal structures (Birnbaum 1988: 1983). 
Nonetheless, from an organisational scholarship 
perspective, the direct effects (intended and un-
intended) on “real” performance resulting from such
adaptive efforts are still, we contend, both under-
investigated and ill-theorised. 
THE sTUDy: coNcEPTUaL asPEcTs aND coNTRIBUTIoN 
The conceptual point of departure for the current
study is the open systems perspective on organisations 
(Scott 2003). As open systems, organisations adapt
to their environments in order to reduce uncertainty
and increase legitimacy, increasing the likelihood of
future survival and/or success (Greenwood et al. 
2008). Given the constant needs for environmental 
scanning and local adaptation, internal units are 
often organised in a loosely-coupled manner with 
system-level coordination kept to a minimum (Weick
1976). Highly responsive (open) entities consist of
participants organised around a rather loose 
coalition of shifting interest groups and agendas 
(Cyert and March 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
Increasing professionalisation and formalisation of
activities (i.e. the definition of roles and responsibilities, 
the devising of operational rules and procedures, the
setting og reward systems, etc.), are thought to; (a) 
enhance control over participants’ behaviour, 
(b) foster predictability, and (c) leverage integration
efforts; therefore resulting in “rationalised efficiency”
(Weber 1968). Bureaucratic systems have, traditionally, 
been devised for coping with relatively stable 
environments with rules and procedures being 
adopted in a routinized fashion (Olsen 2005). In recent 
years, and across the public sector, more flexible 
bureaucratic forms have come to the fore, in the 
form of New Public Management (npm) approaches 
inspired by more efficient designs from the private 
sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). For specific 
organisational entities like universities the above 
process has resulted in increasing rationalisation 
(Krücken and Meier 2006) and the restructuring of
administrative layers at various organisational levels.
Amongst other things, proponents of academic 
restructuring argue that, in order to increase 
organisational efficiency and integration (horizontal/
vertical), the traditional fragmentation and 
entrepreneurialism characterising academic systems
will need to be mitigated (Gumport and Pusser 1997:
19). Institutional adaptation, it is argued, is best 
accomplished when environmental demands are 
managed, on a daily basis, by a cadre of properly 
trained professional administrators (Gumport and 
Sporn 1999; Gornitzska and Larsen 2004). 
The study assumes that the growth of personnel 
and administrative bodies at universities is an 
accurate indicator of increasing bureaucratisation. 
Following Gornitzska and colleagues (1998), a 
distinction is made between administrative and 
academic bureaucratisation, and that a positive 
correlation between the two is likely to occur (Coccia
2009). The growth in administrative structures and 
the consequent rise in structural complexity are 
likely to result in increasing coordination costs, i.e.
diseconomies of scale (Coccia and Rolfo 2007). 
Bearing in mind earlier contributions (Gumport and
Pusser 1995; Gumport and Sporn 1999; Gornitzska 
et al. 1998; Gornitzska and Larsen 2004), the current
investigation moves beyond explanatory dimensions
(why it occurs?) and focuses instead on accessing
the impacts or effects of increasing bureaucratisation. 
Two specific levels are analysed; the academic core 
(research performance) and the extended periphery 
(entrepreneurial efforts), an area neglected in the
existing literature. The study recurs to a comparative 
methodological design, by drawing upon quantitative
and qualitative data sets from public universities in 
Europe and the U.S. As far as theoretical insights 
are concerned, through looking at a complex
organisational entity like the university, the study
aims at contributing to a better understanding of 
the evolution (adaptation) of organisational forms 
with a particular emphasis given to the interplay 
between various modes of organising: hierarchies 
(bureaucratic structures), collegial forms (networks), 
and market-based mechanisms (e.g. in the 
commercialisation of knowledge). 
WoRK PLaN aND DELIvERaBLEs 
Starting in the fall of 2010, the above study is 
expected to last between 12 and 18 months, pending
on the final research design being adopted (in 
collaboration with the respective academic advisors 
at Stanford). The communication of results will occur
in the following (2) forms: (a) Two scholarly journal 
articles in major peer reviewed outlets, one in the 
field of organisational studies and the other in a topR
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journal in the field of higher education studies; 
(b) Presentation of empirical results and theoretical 
contributions at two (2) major international 
conferences in the field of higher education studies:
at cher (European Consortium of Higher Education
Researchers) and at ashe (the North American 
Association for the Study of Higher Education), in 
addition to participation in various seminars and 
workshops in the u.s. and Europe. 
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